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外媒:從事中國研究的學者都被收買了嗎?

— -- 遠東經濟評論:從事中國研究的學者都被收買了嗎?

本文作者Carsten A. Holz,經濟學家,香港科技大學社會科學部教授(professor in the social science division of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

從事中國研究的學術界人士,包括本文作者自己,習慣性的討好中共,有時自己明確意識到了,有時沒有意識到。這麼做的動機是為了適應生存環境,我們通過以下方式討好中共:提出某些研究課題或者不提出某些研究課題,報告某些事實或者忽略某些事實,我們使用的語言,我們講授什麼以及如何講授。

外國研究人員必須要和中國研究人員合作,以便搜集數據,合寫研究論文。調查要以中共接受的方式進行,調查內容限制在政治上可以被中共接受的範圍里。對中國研究人員來說,這種選擇是與生俱來的。西方研究人員跟從這種選擇。

中國研究人員在獨自進行學術研究時也要面對同樣的限制。一些西方的中國研究學者在中國有親屬。另外一些人在中國有公寓。那些母語不是漢語的中國研究學者,已經投入多年時間學習語言,把自己的事業建立在這一巨大而無法轉移的投入之上。通過與中國的關係,我們獲取信息和觀點,從中得到利益,因而我們保護這種關係。如此一來,每個人都滿意,西方讀者得到學術界的最新觀點,我們自己得到工作上的成功,中共得到我們為他們提供的廣告宣傳。中國是唯一的,全體知識界都選擇了同一條路:那就是不要讓中共不高興。

如果我們不合作,很明顯後果會是什麼。我們沒法找到中國的合作夥伴。當在中國做研究的時候,我們就遇到麻煩了。李少民是香港城市大學市場系副教授(Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong),美國公民,他在中國監獄裏被關了5個月,罪名是「危害國家安全」。按李少民自己的解釋,他的罪過包括對中國的政治制度持批評態度,訪問台灣,得到來自台灣的經費進行敏感政治題目的研究,在中國收集研究數據。香港城市大學沒有對李少民提供任何支持,獲得自由之後,他馬上離開那裏,來到美國弗吉尼亞Old Dominion大學任教(Old Dominion University in Virginia)。人們會猜測落在中共秘密警察手裏5個月對人的心理會有什麼影響,中共到底用了什麼手段來讓李少民保持沉默。對香港知識界來說,這個信號被清楚的接收到了。

不同學科從事中國研究的學者並不是都受到同等的影響。經濟學家和政治學家比較容易頻繁挑戰中共的禁忌,有時還很激烈。但甚至社會學家和人種學家也會在進行網絡研究或少數族裔文化研究的時候涉足禁區。

我們的自我審查(self-censorship)有多種形式。我們提出和西方有關的問題,而迴避和中國有關的問題。我們努力用基本的經濟學指標來解釋國有企業的利潤,而實際上從其它角度分析可能更說明問題,比如從企業管理質量(由中共組織部任命管理層),或者企業和所有者、僱員、供應商以及顧客打交道所憑藉的政治關係。但是如何能收集到反映中共對國有或政府控制的企業的影響的系統化信息呢?企業里根本沒人願意談論這類事情。

我們談論中國的經濟單位及其發展,好像談論西方的經濟單位一樣。中央和地方大量「價格管制」的規章,給了官員們極大的權力來干預價格制定的過程。但是我們接收官方公佈的數字,上面說90%的商品的交易價格是市場決定的。我們不對中文詞「市場」(shichang)的定義表示疑問,而把它直接翻譯成「市場」(market),假設它的意思和西方的market是一樣的。

與此類似,我們接受中國的公司法(Company Law)表面宣稱的、沒有提及中國共產黨的字面意思,儘管有了公司法,中共仍然會對公司發號施令。只有深入了解,人們才會發現不容置疑的證據:中共陝西省委和陝西省政府在2006年發出聯合指示,明確要求國有企業(包括公司,companies)的黨支部參與一切企業決策,這個指示還要求全省所有國有企業,董事會主席和黨支部書記原則上應該是同一個人。在國家一層,最大的50家中央控制的國有企業,這些在世界各地投資的國有企業,它們的最高管理人由中共政治局直接任命。經濟學家不去問問:如果美國或者歐洲的執政黨中央不斷增加對企業的參與,會意味着什麼?

中國中央銀行行長兼黨委書記周小川,寫了大量關於用「三個代表」「全面促進中央銀行工作」的中文文章。他用完全違背西方的邏輯概念的方式,論述三個代表是「宏觀經濟的指導原則」。但是我們以對待西方中央銀行行長的認真態度對待這個人,好像中國的中央銀行真的制定貨幣政策,好像中國的貨幣政策的操作渠道,以及對經濟的影響,和西方一樣。

我們很幼稚嗎?或者我們忽略中央銀行行長的第二身份--或者第一身份--中共黨委書記,是合適的?我們下意識的迴避了某些我們不理解的事情?或者我們只是因為它們不符合西方經濟學概念而假裝看不見?

連篇累牘的文章探討中國收入分化日漸增加的原因。我們忽略了這樣一個事實:中國擁有一億元(1千3百萬美元)或更多個人財產的3,220個人里,2,932人是中共高幹的子女。五個最重要的工業領域,金融,外貿,地產開發,大型工程和安全,85%到90%的核心職位控制在中共高幹子女手裏。

每次改革或調整的項目出台,高幹都從中自肥:價格雙軌體系,貸款黑洞,國有企業財產剝離,投資公司資金和私人養老資金的濫用。不合規則的農村土地併入城市應該可以被定義為地方官僚發動的「有系統的搶劫」。地方高官有大筆投資在安全沒有保證的小煤礦,這些小煤礦理論上說應該關閉,但是沒人知道為什麼它們依然在運轉。

經濟信息的普遍匱乏決定了我們的研究。當前特定課題的統計數字,都是國家統計局按照中共中央委員會和國務院的特定指示收集的。這類信息基本不會公佈。而那些公佈的信息的質量都要打個大問號。官方統計數字之外,各級政府部門都收集並控制內部信息。公佈的信息一般往往是宣傳,出於某種隱秘的動機才加以發佈。研究中國經濟的經濟學家採取的一個辦法是,放棄進行精確的調查,而是在方便的假設基礎上建立抽象的經濟學模型:假設有完美的競爭,新技術帶來最大利潤,消費和金融限制之下的家計效用最大化(household utility maximization),等等。這種辦法能在多大程度上反映真實的中國還很難說。

其他研究中國經濟的人公開接受中共的青睞。我們可以運用關係聯絡政府高官。在做實地考察的時候我們會得到地方政府和地方黨委的接待,有一次,他們給我提供了一輛車,一名高官和一個地方官。他們給我介紹了一個企業主管,可以想像,他的答案都是沒有任何問題的。陪同人員毫無例外都很支持,但我最終完全在他們設計的盒子裏工作(這大概是我唯一沒有完成的研究項目)。更有甚者,那些採訪官員的人可能不僅是無意中作了中共的工具,而且可能作了政府內鬥的工具。

我們大量使用符合中共自我包裝的形象的語言。難道「對法律和政府充滿敵意的秘密社團」,不是對中共行動的隱秘性和置於法律之上的統治方式的準確描述嗎?在Webster「新世界大學字典上」(Webster’s New World College Dictionary),這是「黑手黨」(mafia)的定義。

我們使用中國「政府」這個名詞,卻不進一步說明95%的「政府高官」是中共黨員,關鍵決策是這些人在黨務工作會議上決定的,政府人事部和黨委組織部實際上是同一套人員,監察部和中共紀律委員會實際上是同一套人員,中華人民共和國中央軍事委員會和中國共產黨中央軍事委員會是100%同一套人員。中國政府是在管理中國?還是僅僅作為中共的一個器官執行中共的決定?通過使用「政府」這個詞,讓中國「政府」等同於其他政府、特別是西方政府是正確的做法嗎?把它稱為「有中國特色的政府」甚至「黑手黨的前台代表」,是不是更加準確呢?誰質疑中共統治中國的合法性,以及中共的統治方式呢?

中共的--或者說黑手黨的--名詞充滿我們的寫作和授課。我們不去問中國共產黨是不是共產主義者,人民代表大會是不是代表人民,人民解放軍是解放還是壓迫人民,或者法官們是不是都由中共任命並且服從中共。我們說「天安門事件」,與中共的語言相一致,而在1989年天安門大屠殺剛發生後,我們稱之為「天安門大屠殺」,那時用「事件」來稱呼讓我們顯得對中共太順從。

有哪一本西方教科書詳細論述中國的政治系統呢?哪本教科書解釋中共欽定並在事實上任命政府官員和國會代表?哪本教科書指出這些程序和我們西方理解的政黨,政府和國會不一樣?在中共的帶領下,我們通過使用西方政治語彙來稱呼中共的冒牌貨,從而使中共的偽裝合法化。我們甚至不願用中共自己使用的名字來稱呼中共:專政(以工人階級為基礎的工農聯合的「人民」民主專政,也就是無產階級專政)。

我們指出了系統性的買賣政府官位和中共官位了嗎?發生在黑龍江的醜聞告訴了我們官位的標價,從省一級到縣一級,你不會從任何一本教科書里找到這個價目表。廣為人知的賣官鬻爵沒什麼機會作其他解釋。如果買賣官位的人對自己的行為並不感到害怕,黑手黨的統治和封口原則一定是超出想像的強大。

不正常的事情在中國被當作正常事情接受了。電腦黑客從香港大學伺服器上搜集一個系科教師收到的電子郵件,直到他們不小心刪除了郵件,這個事件才被發現。黑客們的地址來自大陸3家網絡服務提供商,全部3個IP位址都指向國有通訊公司。在中國,外國學生公寓的工作人員里包括安全官員,他們監視外國學生,記錄他們的行動。在屬於上海三級教育系統的一個教育部門,使用校園電腦在搜尋引擎里輸入「江澤民」,連續三次導致整個校園不能連通那個搜尋引擎。傳言中共要僱用幾萬名網絡警察。電話如果不是被系統的錄音,也會被監聽。電子郵件被過濾,有時根本不給接收。這種情況下,誰還學不會本能的避開中共不喜歡他們思考或做的事情呢?

中共的宣傳深深的紮根於我們的思考中。「社會穩定」和現在所謂「和諧社會」的提法被無條件的接受,認為對中國很重要。可是一個每天發生超過200起社會衝突事件的國家真的社會穩定嗎?真的社會和諧嗎?或者「社會穩定」僅僅意味着接受黑手黨的統治?

「中央是好的,都是地方政府不好」是另外一個宣傳俗套,這也被國外研究界不帶疑問的接受了,這個說法進而影響研究的問題設定。然而如果把中共看作黑手黨的話,就不會有那種美好的感覺,讓外面的學術界了解這一看法,就在建議中央隱藏了可怕的另一面,而且毫無疑問是帶着某種目的加以隱藏。

我們看到了「結果」(成功的改革),但不去懷疑「動機」。中共的增長宣傳被忠實的接受為國家的總體目標和改革成功與否的一個測量指標。沒人質疑增長得以實現所依賴的政治制度。黑手黨統治中國還算有效率,何必還關心這種效率是如何實現的?何必關心「附帶效果」?很明顯我們知道存在勞改營,人們未經審判就被關進去,也許就在裏面蒸發,我們知道有人遭受國家安全部門的刑訊,我們知道法輪功信徒遭到的處置,但我們選擇往前看,繼續我們消了毒的研究和教學。我們對中國政治體制導致的3千萬人死於大躍進造成的饑荒,75萬-150萬人在文化大革命中被謀殺視而不見。什麼才能讓西方學術界停下來想一想:他們到底在與誰共眠?

如果學術界不去想,還有誰會呢?世界銀行和其他國際組織也不會,因為他們從與中國打交道中獲利。他們的銀行關係依賴於中共的緊密合作,他們在研究合作上的事實是,最後的報告和公開聲明都必須通過中共的審查。西方投資銀行的研究部門也不會,因為銀行的其他部門很可能依賴於和中國買賣。

這一切有關係嗎?如果從事中國研究的人忽略他們所處的中國政治環境,影響他們的研究工作的政治限制,這一切有什麼關係嗎?如果我們向西方呈現一個中共領導層一定喜歡我們呈現的中國,給自我審查後的研究問題提供狹窄的回答,把中國的政治制度描繪出一幅合乎常理的圖像,這一切有什麼關係嗎?

從購買力的角度,中國經濟規模將在2008或2009年超過美國。中國是一個與西方經濟體越來越相關的國家:1/4的中國工業是國外所有,我們依賴中國工業來製造廉價消費品。最終,我們的養老金投資在跨國公司,而這些跨國公司越來越選擇在中國從事生產,我們的養老金依賴於中國的經濟成長。然而西方理解拿過國家以及那個國家的統治者嗎?在什麼時候,通過什麼渠道,中共領導層的不同的人權觀和民權觀會影響我們政治組織的選擇和西方的政治自由呢(就像已經影響了西方學術研究和教學一樣)?在多大程度上,從事中國研究的學者因他們把自己的飯碗置於誠實的思考和教學之上而感覺羞愧呢?

英文原文:

Have China Scholars All Been Bought?
《遠東經濟評論》(Far Eastern Economic Review), April 2007


by Carsten A. Holz

Have China Scholars All Been Bought?
April 2007

by Carsten A. Holz
 
Academics who study China, which includes the author, habitually please the Chinese Communist Party, sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously. Our incentives are to conform, and we do so in numerous ways: through the research questions we ask or don’t ask, through the facts we report or ignore, through our use of language, and through what and how we teach.
 

FRED HARPER
 
Foreign academics must cooperate with academics in China to collect data and co-author research. Surveys are conducted in a manner that is acceptable to the Party, and their content is limited to politically acceptable questions. For academics in China, such choices come naturally. The Western side plays along.
 
China researchers are equally constrained in their solo research. Some Western China scholars have relatives in China. Others own apartments there. Those China scholars whose mother tongue is not Chinese have studied the language for years and have built their careers on this large and nontransferable investment. We benefit from our connections in China to obtain information and insights, and we protect these connections. Everybody is happy, Western readers for the up-to-date view from academia, we ourselves for prospering in our jobs, and the Party for getting us to do its advertising. China is fairly unique in that the incentives for academics all go one way: One does not upset the Party.
 
What happens when we don’t play along is all too obvious. We can’t attract Chinese collaborators. When we poke around in China to do research we run into trouble. Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong and a U.S. citizen, spent five months in a Chinese jail on charges of 「endangering state security.」 In his own words, his crimes were his critical views of China’s political system, his visits to Taiwan, his use of Taiwanese funds to conduct research on politically sensitive issues, and his collecting research data in China. City University offered no support, and once he was released he went to teach at Old Dominion University in Virginia. One may wonder what five months in the hands of Chinese secret police does to one’s psyche, and what means the Party used to silence Mr. Li. To academics in Hong Kong, the signal was not lost.
 
China researchers across different disciplines may not all be equally affected. Economists and political scientists are likely to come up against the Party constraint frequently, and perhaps severely. But even sociologists or ethnographers can reach the forbidden zone when doing network studies or examining ethnic minority cultures.
Our self-censorship takes many forms. We ask Western instead of China-relevant questions. We try to explain the profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by basic economic factors, when it may make more sense to explain it by the quality of enterprise management (hand-picked by the Party’s 「Organization Department」), or by the political constraints an enterprise faces, or by the political and bureaucratic channels through which an enterprise interacts with its owners, employees, suppliers and buyers. But how to collect systematic information about the influence of the Party on the operation of a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise, when these are typically matters that nobody in the enterprise will speak about?
 
We talk about economic institutions and their development over time as if they were institutions in the West. 「Price administration」 regulations, central and local, abound, giving officials far-reaching powers to interfere in the price-setting process. Yet we accept official statistics that show 90% of all prices, by trading value, to be market-determined. We do not question the meaning of the Chinese word shichang, translated as 「market,」 but presume it to be the same as in the West.
 
Similarly, we take at face value China’s Company Law, which makes no mention of the Party, even though the Party is likely to still call the shots in the companies organized under the Company Law. Only if one digs deeper will one find unambiguous evidence: The Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and the Shaanxi government in a joint circular of 2006 explicitly require the Party cell in state-owned enterprises (including 「companies」) to participate in all major enterprise decisions; the circular also requests that in all provincial state-owned enterprises the chairman of the board of directors and the Party secretary, in principle, are one and the same person. At the national level, the leadership of the 50 largest central state-owned enterprises—enterprises that invest around the world—is directly appointed by the Politburo. Economists do not ask what it means if the Party center increasingly runs enterprises in the U.S. and Europe.
 
The governor and Party secretary of China’s central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, writes extensively in Chinese about 「comprehensively accelerating central bank work」 based on the 「three represents」 (the Party represents the 「advanced productive forces, the advanced Chinese culture and the basic interests of the Chinese people」). He describes the three represents as 「guiding macroeconomic policy」 in ways that defy any Western concept of logic. And yet we take this person as seriously as if we were dealing with the governor of a Western central bank, as if China’s central bank were truly setting monetary policy, and as if the channels through which monetary policy operates in China and the impact monetary policy has on the economy are the same as in the West.
 
Are we naïve? Or are we justified in ignoring the central bank governor’s second—or rather, first—life as Party secretary? Are we subconsciously shutting out something that we do not comprehend, or something we do not want to see because it doesn’t fit into our neat, Western economic concepts?
 
Article after article pores over the potential economic reasons for the increase in income inequality in China. We ignore the fact that of the 3,220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of 100 million yuan ($13 million) or more, 2, 932 are children of high-level cadres. Of the key positions in the five industrial sectors—finance, foreign trade, land development, large-scale engineering and securities—85% to 90% are held by children of high-level cadres.
 
With the introduction of each new element of reform and transition, cadres enrich themselves: the dual track price system, the nonperforming loans, the asset-stripping of SOEs, the misuse of funds in investment companies and in private pension accounts. The overwhelmingly irregular transformation of rural into urban land may well qualify as 「systematic looting」 by local 「leaders.」 Local cadres are heavily invested in the small, unsafe coal mines they are supposed to close, and nobody knows how they obtained their stakes in these operations.
 
A general dearth of economic information shapes our research. Statistics on specific current issues are collected by the National Bureau of Statistics on special request of the Party Central Committee and the State Council. None of this information is likely to be available to the public. The quality of the statistics that are published comes with a large question mark. Outside the realm of official statistics, government departments at all levels collect and control internal information. What is published tends to be propaganda—pieces of information released with an ulterior objective in mind. One solution for China economists then is to resign themselves to conducting sterilized surveys and to building abstract models on the basis of convenient assumptions—of perfect competition, profit maximization given a production technology, household utility maximization with respect to consumption and subject to financial constraints, etc. How much this can tell us about China is unclear.
 
Other China economists openly accept favors from the Party. We can use our connections to link up with government cadres. We may be hosted in field research by local governments and local Party committees. A local Party committee, at one point, helped me out by providing a car, a Party cadre and a local government official. They directed me to enterprise managers who, presumably, gave all the right answers. The hosts were invariably highly supportive, but I ended up working in exactly the box in which they were thinking and operating. (This seems to be the only research project that I never completed.) Furthermore, those who go to the field and interview cadres may not only unwillingly become a tool of the Party, but also a tool in departmental infighting.
 
Our use of language to conform to the image the Party wishes to project is pervasive. Would the description 「a secret society characterized by an attitude of popular hostility to law and government」 not properly describe the secrecy of the Party’s operations, its supremacy above the law and its total control of government? In Webster’s New World College Dictionary, this is the definition of 「mafia.」
 
We speak of the Chinese 「government」 without further qualification when more than 95% of the 「leadership cadres」 are Party members, key decisions are reached by leadership cadres in their function as members of Party work committees, the staff of the government Personnel Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Organization Department, the staff of the Supervision Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Disciplinary Commission, and the staff of the PRC Central Military Commission is usually 100% identical to the staff of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. Does China’s government actually govern China, or is it merely an organ that implements Party decisions? By using the word 「government,」 is it correct to grant the Chinese 「government」 this association with other, in particular Western, governments, or would it not be more accurate to call it the 「government with Chinese characteristics」 or the 「mafia’s front man」? Who questions the legitimacy of the Party leadership to rule China, and to rule it the way it does?
 
The Party’s—or, the mafia’s—terminology pervades our writing and teaching. We do not ask if the Chinese Communist Party is communist, the People’s Congresses are congresses of the people, the People’s Liberation Army is liberating or suppressing the people, or if the judges are not all appointed by the Party and answer to the Party. We say 「Tiananmen incident,」 in conformance with Party terminology, but called it 「Tiananmen massacre」 right after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, when 「incident」 would have made us look too submissive to the Party.
 
Which Western textbook on China’s political system elaborates on the Party’s selection and de facto appointment of government officials and parliamentary delegates, and, furthermore, points out these procedures as different from how we view political parties, government and parliament in the West? By following the Party’s lead in giving the names of Western institutions to fake Chinese imitations, we sanctify the Party’s pretenses. We are not even willing to call China what its own constitution calls it: a dictatorship (a 「people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat」).
 
Who lays out the systematic sale of leadership positions across Chinese governments and Party committees? The Heilongjiang scandal provides the going price list from the province down to the county level, a list not to be found in any textbook. The publicly known scope of the sale of positions does not leave much room for interpretation. For these salesmen and saleswomen of government positions to have nothing to fear, the rule of the mafia and its code of silence must be powerful beyond imagination.
 
What is not normal is accepted as normal for China. Hackers were collecting the incoming emails of a faculty member of the University of Hong Kong from the university’s server until they were found out in June 2005, when they accidentally deleted emails. The hackers came from three mainland Internet provider addresses, and all three IP addresses are state telecommunications firms. Within China, the staff of the foreign students』 dormitories includes public security officials who keep tabs on foreign students and compile each student’s file. In a Shanghai institution of tertiary education, typing 「Jiang Zemin」 into a search engine from a computer located on campus, three times in a row, leads to the automatic shutdown of access to that search engine for the whole campus. The Party is rumored to employ tens of thousands of Internet 「police.」 Phone calls are listened to, if not systematically recorded. Emails are filtered and sometimes not delivered. Who will not learn to instinctively avoid what the Party does not want them to think or do?
 
Party propaganda has found its way deeply into our thinking. The importance of 「social stability」 and nowadays a 「harmonious society」 are accepted unconditionally as important for China. But is a country with more than 200 incidents of social unrest every day really socially stable, and its society harmonious? Or does 「socially stable」 mean no more than acceptance of the rule of the mafia?
 
「Local government bad, central government good」 is another propaganda truism that is accepted unquestioningly in the foreign research community, informing and shaping research questions. Yet, viewing the Party as a mafia, there is no room for such niceties, and reporting outside academia indeed suggests that the center hides a rather hideous second face, and inevitably does so for a purpose.
We see the 「ends」—successful reform—and don’t question the 「means.」 The Party’s growth mantra is faithfully accepted as the overarching objective for the country and the one measure of successful reform. Nobody lingers on the political mechanisms through which growth is achieved. The mafia runs China rather efficiently, so why worry about how it is done, and what the 「side effects」 are? We obviously know of the labor camps into which people disappear without judiciary review, of torture inflicted by the personnel of state 「security」 organs, and of the treatment of Falun Gong, but choose to move on with our sterilized research and teaching. We ignore that China’s political system is responsible for 30 million dead from starvation in the Great Leap Forward, and 750,000 to 1.5 million murders during the Cultural Revolution. What can make Western academics stop and think twice about who they have bedded down with?
 
If academics don’t, who will? The World Bank and other international organizations won’t because they profit from dealing with China. Their banking relationship depends on amicable cooperation with the Party, and a de facto requirement of their research collaboration is that the final report and the public statements are acceptable to Party censors. The research departments of Western investment banks won’t because the banks』 other arms likely depend on business with China.
 
Does this all matter? Does it matter if China researchers ignore the political context in which they operate and the political constraints that shape their work? Does it matter if we present China to the West the way the Party leadership must like us to present China, providing narrow answers to our self-censored research questions and offering a sanitized picture of China’s political system?
The size of China’s economy will exceed that of the U.S., in purchasing power terms, by 2008 or 2009. China is a country with which Western economies are increasingly intertwined: A quarter of Chinese industry is foreign-owned and we depend on Chinese industry for cheap consumer goods. Ultimately, our pensions, invested in multinationals that increasingly produce in China, depend on the continued economic rise of China. But does the West understand that country and its rulers? At what point, and through what channels, will the Party leadership with its different views of human rights and the citizens』 rights affect our choices of political organization and political freedoms in the West (as it has affected academic research and teaching)? And to what extent are China researchers guilty of putting their own rice bowl before honest thinking and teaching?
 
Mr. Holz is an economist and professor in the social science division of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

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