《經濟學人》解讀美國對中[共]國的圍堵戰略 (英中文)
Banyan
They have returned
China should worry less about America’s 「containment」 strategy and more about why the neighbours welcome it
Aug 12th 2010
SYMBOLIC gestures come in all shapes and sizes, but few as imposing as that of the USS George Washington, a ship more than three football-pitches long, and capable of carrying 85 aircraft and more than 6,200 people. But even symbols of such massive heft can be interpreted in various ways. The George Washington has just been in the South China Sea, off the coast of Danang, once home to one of the American army’s biggest bases in Vietnam. Fifteen years after the opening of diplomatic relations, and 35 years since the end of the Vietnam war, the carrier’s visit, and the joint naval exercises that followed, were striking tokens of reconciliation. But observers in China saw a different sort of gesture: not so much a handshake with a former enemy; more a brandished fist towards a potential one, their own country.
Vituperative Chinese commentators detected an old bogey: an American attempt to 「contain」 China by bolstering alliances with its neighbours. China’s leaders were more restrained (or perhaps just slower off the mark). But the South China Morning Post reported that Hu Jintao, the president, was in enough of a huff about this and other slights to contemplate delaying a visit to America. Just when the ice that formed after the Sino-American climate-change tiff in Copenhagen in December seemed to have melted, a new chill has set in. 「Sweet-mouthed」 American politicians, lamented Global Times, an English-language Chinese newspaper, 「stab you in the back when you are not looking.」
Chinese analysts can point to an impressive array of American 「provocations」 to justify their fulminations. They cited reports that America is in talks on nuclear co-operation with Vietnam, and that, in an apparent reversal for its non-proliferation efforts, the Obama administration is not insisting that Vietnam forswear enriching its own uranium. As with America’s 2008 nuclear deal with India, China scented double standards.
China also faced an unsettling experience in July, at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum organised by the Association of South-East Asian Nations. This usually soporific security talking-shop, held this year in Hanoi, saw Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, declare the South China Sea a 「national interest」. When 12 of the 27 countries there spoke up for a new approach to solving their maritime disputes, China sniffed co-ordination—nay, conspiracy—especially when Vietnam swiftly stepped up its protests about Chinese activities in disputed waters.
Before her jaunt to Vietnam, the George Washington had been taking part in joint exercises with South Korean forces. Respecting Chinese sensitivities, she did not exercise in the Yellow Sea, just off China’s coast. But a Pentagon spokesman has said she will do so 「in the near future」. This comes as America’s ties with South Korea have been strengthened—and China’s frayed—by the destruction of a naval vessel, the Cheonan, in March. South Korea and America, backed by an international inquiry, have blamed the sinking on a North Korean torpedo. The North has denied responsibility and China has refused to finger its awkward ally.
As the American navy has roamed China’s neighbourhood, senior officials have fanned out over Asia. In Indonesia Robert Gates, the defence secretary, upset human-rights activists and delighted the government by resuming links to Kopassus, the army’s special forces. William Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, has been to four South-East Asian countries.
It all amounts to what Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment, a Washington think-tank, has called 「the most comprehensive burst of diplomatic and military activity in Asia, particularly South-East Asia, in decades」 from an American administration. It is not surprising that many in China see all this as part of a new containment doctrine. Many in America do, too. By this analysis, Barack Obama took office committed to good relations with China, and ready to welcome it as a great power in return for China’s accepting the global responsibilities that go with that status. Then a series of setbacks convinced him to stand up to China with a more muscular strategy. The 「sweet mouths」 spout charm just the same; but containment is now the game.
That is far from how the administration presents it, however. It argues it is merely reasserting a 「national interest」 and traditional role in East Asia, a region neglected by an America distracted by terrorism and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent without leave, America helped foster an overblown perception in the region of America’s decline and China’s ascent. It is now putting that right. In Mr Paal’s phrase, America’s recent Asian diplomacy is 「not aimed at China, but has implications for China」.
A container has several sides
That may be too nuanced a distinction for the Global Times』 leader-writers. But those implications are indeed worth pondering. China seems to have digested one already: that the swagger, bordering on arrogance, with which Chinese officials were throwing their weight around in the region and in the West in the depths of the financial crisis created unnecessary alarm. These days, courtesy is back in vogue.
Another implication is that rather than simply rail against America, China could do more to prevent its neighbours providing such fertile ground for the 「seeds of distrust」 it sows. That would demand greater clarity over China’s real strategic aims, and a willingness to discuss them in multilateral forums. On the South China Sea, for example, it is hard to know exactly what its claim is based on. Yet its ships sometimes treat the sea as a Chinese lake; its maps show a great lolling tongue of Chinese sovereignty stuck insolently out at the South-East Asian littoral states. No wonder those countries welcome American aircraft-carriers. The trouble is, of course, that if China were clearer about its aims, they might welcome them even more.
《經濟學人》解讀美國對中[共]國的圍堵戰略
相比美國對中[共]國的「圍堵」戰略本身，中共更應該擔憂為何自己的鄰國會歡迎美國的戰略。
雖說象徵性姿態的形式與規模多種多樣，但卻很少有像美國「喬治•華盛頓號」核動力航空母艦那樣威風凜凜的。「華盛頓號」核動力航母比三個足球場的總長還要長，能夠運載85架直升飛機，可承載的人數超過6200人，是世界上噸位最大的航母之一。但即便是如此重量級的象徵性姿態，也可以用多種方式進行解讀。前不久「華盛頓號」核動力航母穿過南中[共]國海，停靠在越南的峴港。峴港曾經是美國軍隊在越南建立的最大軍事基地之一。在美越建交15周年、越戰結束35周年之際，美國「華盛頓號」核動力航母訪問越南，以及隨後進行的美越聯合海上軍事演習，都象徵着美越兩國的和解。但中[共]國的觀察家看到的卻是這一象徵性姿態的另一層含義：沒有誰會和曾經的敵人（越南）如此友好地握手，此舉更像是美國在向其潛在的敵人——中共——揮拳示威。
指責美國的中共評論員發現了一個令人擔憂的古老問題：美國試圖通過加強與中[共]國鄰國的結盟關係來「圍堵」中[共]國。中共領導人對此則較為謹慎（亦或只是行動更為遲緩一些）。不過據香港《南華早報》報道，國家主席胡錦濤對此惱怒不已，預期將推遲訪美的時間。去年12月份在哥本哈根氣候峰會上，中美之間就在氣候變化議題上起了爭執；正當那次爭執所凝結的寒冰似乎就要融化時，一股新的寒流又到來了。中共《環球時報》英文版悲嘆道，「口蜜腹劍的」美國政客「在他不注意時在背後捅了他一刀。」
中共的分析家能夠舉出一系列令人難忘的美國「挑釁行為」來證明他們的嚴詞譴責是正當的。他們援引報道稱，美國正與越南秘密談判核合作的事宜；奧巴馬行政分支並未強調越南必須放棄鈾濃縮，這明顯與美國在核不擴散方面的努力背道而馳。正如2008年美國與印度的核交易一樣，中[共]國此次也嗅出了美國在核不擴散上的雙重標準。
在7月份由東盟（ASEAN）組織的年度地區論壇上，中共也遭遇了一次令人不安的經歷。這種通常不具有實質性意義的安全會議，今年在越南首都河內召開，美國國務卿希拉里•克林頓在會上宣稱，南中國海是美國的「國家利益」。當27個參會國家中的其中12個支持採取新方案來解決他們之間的海事糾紛時，尤其當越南迅速對中共在爭議海域的活動表示強烈抗議時，中共嗅出了這是美國與這些國家之間的「合作」——不，其實是合謀。
在 「華盛頓號」核動力航母訪問越南之前，曾參加了美國與韓國軍方進行的聯合軍事演習。鑑於中共對美韓聯合軍事演習的敏感，「華盛頓號」核動力航母沒有參加在黃海海域進行的演習，黃海剛好在中[共]國的海岸線外。但是一位五角大樓發言人稱，「在不久的將來」「華盛頓號」核動力航母將會進入黃海海域。今年3月，韓國海軍艦艇「天安號」被朝鮮擊沉，「天安號」事件造成的美韓聯盟的加強，以及與中共的摩擦，促成了這次美韓聯合軍事演習。韓國與美國，在國際質疑的聲援之下，責備朝鮮使用魚雷擊沉「天安號」的行徑。但是朝鮮方面否認自己擔有責任，而中共也拒絕指認自己拙劣的盟友（朝鮮）。
隨着美國海軍週遊中[共]國眾多鄰國之時，美國高級官員在亞洲的活動也成扇形之勢散開。在印度尼西亞，美國國防部長羅伯特•蓋茨與印尼的特種部隊（Kopassus）重新獲得聯繫，此舉使得印尼政府十分高興；但由於此前該特種部隊在印尼群島上糟糕的人權記錄，此舉使印尼的人權活動家極為不安。美國負責政治事務的副國務卿威廉•伯恩斯，也已經訪問了4個東南亞國家。
正如華盛頓智庫卡內基國際和平基金會（Carnegie Endowment）知名中國問題專家包道格（Douglas Paal）所言，這一切實際上是美國行政分支「幾十年來在亞洲，尤其是東南亞，外交與軍事活動最全面的爆發」。所以許多中[共]國人將所有這一切視為美國新的圍堵政策的一部分，也並不奇怪。而且美國也有許多人與中[共]國人的看法一樣。根據這一分析，巴拉克•奧巴馬在就任總統時承諾與中[共]國維持良好的關係，同時當中[共]國開始承擔大國地位伴隨而來的全球責任時，美國將會以歡迎中[共]國的大國地位作為回報。但是隨後一系列的挫折使得奧巴馬確信，必須以更強硬的策略與中共進行對抗。與2008年奧巴馬的就職演說一樣，如今滔滔不絕的「嘴甜」依舊；只是現在的策略不再是歡迎，而是圍堵。
然而，這與美國行政分支的描述卻相去甚遠。美國行政分支認為，他們僅僅只是重申了美國在東亞的「國家利益」以及其所扮演的傳統角色。由於在伊拉克與阿富汗的反恐戰爭中分身乏術，東亞這一地區被美國所忽視。缺席但並未離去，在東亞美國實際上幫助培養了這樣一種過頭的認識：即美國在衰落，中[共]國在崛起。現在美國正在糾正自己對東亞的忽視。用包道格先生的話說，美國最近的亞洲外交「不是針對中[共]國，而是暗示中[共]國」。
合圍之勢
對於中共《環球時報》的社論作者而言，這兩者的差別可能太過細微。不過那些暗示的確值得中共深思。中共國似乎已經領會了其中一點：趾高氣昂而又態度傲慢的中共官員曾在東亞四處施壓；在深陷金融危機的西方，中共又在發佈不必要的警告。這些天來，中共又開始「韜光養晦」了。
另一個暗示是，中共完全可以做更多的工作，去阻止自己的鄰國為自己曾種下的「不可信任的種子」提供這樣的沃土，而不是一味地責罵美國。這將要求中共更加明確自己真正的戰略目標，同時願意在多邊論壇上去進行討論。比如，在南中國海的問題上，很難確切知道中共所作聲明的依據是什麼？有時候中[共]國的船隻已經將這片海域當作自己的一個湖泊了；中[共]國的地圖上一個垂下的舌尖，顯示着中共的主權傲慢地伸向東南亞的沿海國家。所以那些國家歡迎美國的航空母艦，也就不足為怪了。當然問題是，如果中共更加明晰了自己的目標，那些國家（出於對找准目標的中共的懼怕）可能會更厲害地倒向美國。
Banyan
They have returned
China should worry less about America’s 「containment」 strategy and more about why the neighbours welcome it
Aug 12th 2010
SYMBOLIC gestures come in all shapes and sizes, but few as imposing as that of the USS George Washington, a ship more than three football-pitches long, and capable of carrying 85 aircraft and more than 6,200 people. But even symbols of such massive heft can be interpreted in various ways. The George Washington has just been in the South China Sea, off the coast of Danang, once home to one of the American army’s biggest bases in Vietnam. Fifteen years after the opening of diplomatic relations, and 35 years since the end of the Vietnam war, the carrier’s visit, and the joint naval exercises that followed, were striking tokens of reconciliation. But observers in China saw a different sort of gesture: not so much a handshake with a former enemy; more a brandished fist towards a potential one, their own country.
Vituperative Chinese commentators detected an old bogey: an American attempt to 「contain」 China by bolstering alliances with its neighbours. China’s leaders were more restrained (or perhaps just slower off the mark). But the South China Morning Post reported that Hu Jintao, the president, was in enough of a huff about this and other slights to contemplate delaying a visit to America. Just when the ice that formed after the Sino-American climate-change tiff in Copenhagen in December seemed to have melted, a new chill has set in. 「Sweet-mouthed」 American politicians, lamented Global Times, an English-language Chinese newspaper, 「stab you in the back when you are not looking.」
Chinese analysts can point to an impressive array of American 「provocations」 to justify their fulminations. They cited reports that America is in talks on nuclear co-operation with Vietnam, and that, in an apparent reversal for its non-proliferation efforts, the Obama administration is not insisting that Vietnam forswear enriching its own uranium. As with America’s 2008 nuclear deal with India, China scented double standards.
China also faced an unsettling experience in July, at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum organised by the Association of South-East Asian Nations. This usually soporific security talking-shop, held this year in Hanoi, saw Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, declare the South China Sea a 「national interest」. When 12 of the 27 countries there spoke up for a new approach to solving their maritime disputes, China sniffed co-ordination—nay, conspiracy—especially when Vietnam swiftly stepped up its protests about Chinese activities in disputed waters.
Before her jaunt to Vietnam, the George Washington had been taking part in joint exercises with South Korean forces. Respecting Chinese sensitivities, she did not exercise in the Yellow Sea, just off China’s coast. But a Pentagon spokesman has said she will do so 「in the near future」. This comes as America’s ties with South Korea have been strengthened—and China’s frayed—by the destruction of a naval vessel, the Cheonan, in March. South Korea and America, backed by an international inquiry, have blamed the sinking on a North Korean torpedo. The North has denied responsibility and China has refused to finger its awkward ally.
As the American navy has roamed China’s neighbourhood, senior officials have fanned out over Asia. In Indonesia Robert Gates, the defence secretary, upset human-rights activists and delighted the government by resuming links to Kopassus, the army’s special forces. William Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, has been to four South-East Asian countries.
It all amounts to what Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment, a Washington think-tank, has called 「the most comprehensive burst of diplomatic and military activity in Asia, particularly South-East Asia, in decades」 from an American administration. It is not surprising that many in China see all this as part of a new containment doctrine. Many in America do, too. By this analysis, Barack Obama took office committed to good relations with China, and ready to welcome it as a great power in return for China’s accepting the global responsibilities that go with that status. Then a series of setbacks convinced him to stand up to China with a more muscular strategy. The 「sweet mouths」 spout charm just the same; but containment is now the game.
That is far from how the administration presents it, however. It argues it is merely reasserting a 「national interest」 and traditional role in East Asia, a region neglected by an America distracted by terrorism and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent without leave, America helped foster an overblown perception in the region of America’s decline and China’s ascent. It is now putting that right. In Mr Paal’s phrase, America’s recent Asian diplomacy is 「not aimed at China, but has implications for China」.
A container has several sides
That may be too nuanced a distinction for the Global Times』 leader-writers. But those implications are indeed worth pondering. China seems to have digested one already: that the swagger, bordering on arrogance, with which Chinese officials were throwing their weight around in the region and in the West in the depths of the financial crisis created unnecessary alarm. These days, courtesy is back in vogue.
Another implication is that rather than simply rail against America, China could do more to prevent its neighbours providing such fertile ground for the 「seeds of distrust」 it sows. That would demand greater clarity over China’s real strategic aims, and a willingness to discuss them in multilateral forums. On the South China Sea, for example, it is hard to know exactly what its claim is based on. Yet its ships sometimes treat the sea as a Chinese lake; its maps show a great lolling tongue of Chinese sovereignty stuck insolently out at the South-East Asian littoral states. No wonder those countries welcome American aircraft-carriers. The trouble is, of course, that if China were clearer about its aims, they might welcome them even more.
《經濟學人》解讀美國對中[共]國的圍堵戰略
相比美國對中[共]國的「圍堵」戰略本身，中共更應該擔憂為何自己的鄰國會歡迎美國的戰略。
雖說象徵性姿態的形式與規模多種多樣，但卻很少有像美國「喬治•華盛頓號」核動力航空母艦那樣威風凜凜的。「華盛頓號」核動力航母比三個足球場的總長還要長，能夠運載85架直升飛機，可承載的人數超過6200人，是世界上噸位最大的航母之一。但即便是如此重量級的象徵性姿態，也可以用多種方式進行解讀。前不久「華盛頓號」核動力航母穿過南中[共]國海，停靠在越南的峴港。峴港曾經是美國軍隊在越南建立的最大軍事基地之一。在美越建交15周年、越戰結束35周年之際，美國「華盛頓號」核動力航母訪問越南，以及隨後進行的美越聯合海上軍事演習，都象徵着美越兩國的和解。但中[共]國的觀察家看到的卻是這一象徵性姿態的另一層含義：沒有誰會和曾經的敵人（越南）如此友好地握手，此舉更像是美國在向其潛在的敵人——中共——揮拳示威。
指責美國的中共評論員發現了一個令人擔憂的古老問題：美國試圖通過加強與中[共]國鄰國的結盟關係來「圍堵」中[共]國。中共領導人對此則較為謹慎（亦或只是行動更為遲緩一些）。不過據香港《南華早報》報道，國家主席胡錦濤對此惱怒不已，預期將推遲訪美的時間。去年12月份在哥本哈根氣候峰會上，中美之間就在氣候變化議題上起了爭執；正當那次爭執所凝結的寒冰似乎就要融化時，一股新的寒流又到來了。中共《環球時報》英文版悲嘆道，「口蜜腹劍的」美國政客「在他不注意時在背後捅了他一刀。」
中共的分析家能夠舉出一系列令人難忘的美國「挑釁行為」來證明他們的嚴詞譴責是正當的。他們援引報道稱，美國正與越南秘密談判核合作的事宜；奧巴馬行政分支並未強調越南必須放棄鈾濃縮，這明顯與美國在核不擴散方面的努力背道而馳。正如2008年美國與印度的核交易一樣，中[共]國此次也嗅出了美國在核不擴散上的雙重標準。
在7月份由東盟（ASEAN）組織的年度地區論壇上，中共也遭遇了一次令人不安的經歷。這種通常不具有實質性意義的安全會議，今年在越南首都河內召開，美國國務卿希拉里•克林頓在會上宣稱，南中國海是美國的「國家利益」。當27個參會國家中的其中12個支持採取新方案來解決他們之間的海事糾紛時，尤其當越南迅速對中共在爭議海域的活動表示強烈抗議時，中共嗅出了這是美國與這些國家之間的「合作」——不，其實是合謀。
在 「華盛頓號」核動力航母訪問越南之前，曾參加了美國與韓國軍方進行的聯合軍事演習。鑑於中共對美韓聯合軍事演習的敏感，「華盛頓號」核動力航母沒有參加在黃海海域進行的演習，黃海剛好在中[共]國的海岸線外。但是一位五角大樓發言人稱，「在不久的將來」「華盛頓號」核動力航母將會進入黃海海域。今年3月，韓國海軍艦艇「天安號」被朝鮮擊沉，「天安號」事件造成的美韓聯盟的加強，以及與中共的摩擦，促成了這次美韓聯合軍事演習。韓國與美國，在國際質疑的聲援之下，責備朝鮮使用魚雷擊沉「天安號」的行徑。但是朝鮮方面否認自己擔有責任，而中共也拒絕指認自己拙劣的盟友（朝鮮）。
隨着美國海軍週遊中[共]國眾多鄰國之時，美國高級官員在亞洲的活動也成扇形之勢散開。在印度尼西亞，美國國防部長羅伯特•蓋茨與印尼的特種部隊（Kopassus）重新獲得聯繫，此舉使得印尼政府十分高興；但由於此前該特種部隊在印尼群島上糟糕的人權記錄，此舉使印尼的人權活動家極為不安。美國負責政治事務的副國務卿威廉•伯恩斯，也已經訪問了4個東南亞國家。
正如華盛頓智庫卡內基國際和平基金會（Carnegie Endowment）知名中國問題專家包道格（Douglas Paal）所言，這一切實際上是美國行政分支「幾十年來在亞洲，尤其是東南亞，外交與軍事活動最全面的爆發」。所以許多中[共]國人將所有這一切視為美國新的圍堵政策的一部分，也並不奇怪。而且美國也有許多人與中[共]國人的看法一樣。根據這一分析，巴拉克•奧巴馬在就任總統時承諾與中[共]國維持良好的關係，同時當中[共]國開始承擔大國地位伴隨而來的全球責任時，美國將會以歡迎中[共]國的大國地位作為回報。但是隨後一系列的挫折使得奧巴馬確信，必須以更強硬的策略與中共進行對抗。與2008年奧巴馬的就職演說一樣，如今滔滔不絕的「嘴甜」依舊；只是現在的策略不再是歡迎，而是圍堵。
然而，這與美國行政分支的描述卻相去甚遠。美國行政分支認為，他們僅僅只是重申了美國在東亞的「國家利益」以及其所扮演的傳統角色。由於在伊拉克與阿富汗的反恐戰爭中分身乏術，東亞這一地區被美國所忽視。缺席但並未離去，在東亞美國實際上幫助培養了這樣一種過頭的認識：即美國在衰落，中[共]國在崛起。現在美國正在糾正自己對東亞的忽視。用包道格先生的話說，美國最近的亞洲外交「不是針對中[共]國，而是暗示中[共]國」。
合圍之勢
對於中共《環球時報》的社論作者而言，這兩者的差別可能太過細微。不過那些暗示的確值得中共深思。中共國似乎已經領會了其中一點：趾高氣昂而又態度傲慢的中共官員曾在東亞四處施壓；在深陷金融危機的西方，中共又在發佈不必要的警告。這些天來，中共又開始「韜光養晦」了。
另一個暗示是，中共完全可以做更多的工作，去阻止自己的鄰國為自己曾種下的「不可信任的種子」提供這樣的沃土，而不是一味地責罵美國。這將要求中共更加明確自己真正的戰略目標，同時願意在多邊論壇上去進行討論。比如，在南中國海的問題上，很難確切知道中共所作聲明的依據是什麼？有時候中[共]國的船隻已經將這片海域當作自己的一個湖泊了；中[共]國的地圖上一個垂下的舌尖，顯示着中共的主權傲慢地伸向東南亞的沿海國家。所以那些國家歡迎美國的航空母艦，也就不足為怪了。當然問題是，如果中共更加明晰了自己的目標，那些國家（出於對找准目標的中共的懼怕）可能會更厲害地倒向美國。
